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Using the American General Social Survey, we explore the link between union membership and perceived 
job insecurity. We find that union members are more likely to fear for their current (and future) job. This 
finding is mainly attributed to the primary and secondary sectors and for recessionary periods. 
Instrumental-variables estimation and the use of attitudinal proxy variables suggest that the positive 
correlation between union membership and perceived job insecurity is not due to self-selection. 
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Nous utilisons le General Social Survey américain afin d’explorer le lien entre l'appartenance à un 
syndicat et la perception d'insécurité de l’emploi. Nous trouvons que les employés syndiqués ont plus 
tendance à être inquiets à propos de leur emploi présent (et futur). Ce résultat est principalement 
attribuable aux secteurs primaire et secondaire et aux périodes de récession.  L'estimation par variables 
instrumentales et l’utilisation de variables de proxy suggèrent que la corrélation positive entre 
l'appartenance à un syndicat et l'insécurité en emploi n'est pas due à un effet de sélection. 
 
Mots clés: Syndicat, Perception de l'insécurité en emploi. 
 
Classification JEL: J51, J63, J64. 1 Introduction
It is widely believed that unions allow their members to beneﬁt from a rent (Bennett &
Kaufman 2007). As such, it is not surprising to observe that union members are more
likely than their non-unionized counterparts to feel that it would be hard to ﬁnd a job with
similar wage and fringe beneﬁts in the event that they were to become unemployed. What
is puzzling, however, is that the same union members are also more likely to feel insecure
about their current job (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998, Brochu & Zhou 2009). For instance, the
American General Social Survey (1978-2008) reveals that 14.2 percent of union workers are
insecure about their current job, while only 10.5 percent of non-union workers report the
same concern. These ﬁgures are surprising as standard labor economics textbooks suggest
that one of the principle purposes of a union is to protect the jobs of its members. The
main goal of our paper is to investigate the causes of the positive correlation between union
membership and current job insecurity.
Understanding the link between union membership and perceived job insecurity is im-
portant as perceptions can have a direct impact on economic outcomes. Within a search
framework, for example, current job insecurity can aﬀect (on-the-job) search intensity. More
generally, increased fear of job loss may have an eﬀect on bargaining, and ultimately on
wage outcomes (Campbell et al. 2007); heightened insecurity regarding future job1 prospects
can aﬀect the wage determination process as it reduces the worker’s outside option. Finally,
perceived job insecurity can inﬂuence workers’ consumption/investment patterns as insecure
workers could delay making important purchases or investments.
The fact that union workers are more insecure about future jobs is intuitive. If unions
succeed in raising wages (Card 1996, Blanchﬂower & Bryson 2004) and non-wage bene-
ﬁts (Budd 2005), and the number of union jobs is constrained (Farber 1990), it would be
harder for a displaced union worker to ﬁnd a job with similar wages and non-wage beneﬁts
(Kuhn & Sweetman 1998). But, the link between unions and current job insecurity is not as
straightforward as it seems. The positive correlation could simply be due to worker or ﬁrm
self selection—‘worriers’ self-selecting into unionized jobs (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998), or
unions emerging in environments where job security is a problem (Freeman & Medoﬀ 1984).
Some potential explanations as to why unionized workers have lower job satisfaction than
non-unionized workers could also apply to perceived job security (see for example Hammer
& Avgar (2005)). The same way union leaders can generate discontent among workers by
increasing expectations about job quality (Hammer & Avgar 2005), they can also aﬀect
1In this paper, we refer to ‘future job’ as the job a worker would expect to ﬁnd if she were to lose her
current job.
1workers’ sensitivity about job security issues; unions may breed perceptions of job insecu-
rity, possibly to justify their presence. Finally, unions could also aﬀect workers’ perceived
job security through the adversarial nature of collective bargaining and its impact on the
workplace climate (Kaufman 2005, Fiorito 2007).
Unions could also aﬀect actual job insecurity directly. If job insecurity enters the union
objective function, then a successful bargaining process would decrease the job insecurity of
its members. On the other hand, a union-induced wage increase would have a disemployment
eﬀect within a simple neo-classical framework, thereby increasing job insecurity. Finally, if
unions reduce the productivity and proﬁtability of ﬁrms, one could see more plant closures
or ﬁrm failures which would also increase job insecurity (Freeman & Kleiner 1999).
There is a theoretical literature suggesting that, in a dynamic setting, the presence of
a union can directly impact layoﬀs. For example, Trejo (1993) proposes a simple dynamic
framework where layoﬀs increase because the union tries to stabilize working hours and union
membership using overtime pay. The exit-voice model predicts that unions reduce quits,
which implies that ﬁrms cannot simply rely on normal attrition to reduce their workforce,
and as such, they may be forced to rely more on layoﬀs. There is some empirical evidence
(Medoﬀ 1979, Blau & Kahn 1983, Pearce 1983, Montgomery 1991) suggesting that ﬁrms
with unionized workers may rely more on layoﬀs than their non-unionized counterparts.
This paper investigates the causes of the positive correlation between union membership
and current job insecurity using American General Social Survey (GSS) data over the 1978-
2008 period. In particular, we explore whether the positive correlation arises from speciﬁc
sectors, speciﬁc points in the business cycle, or whether this correlation is simply due to
self-selection into unionized jobs (based on unobserved ability or inherent fear). We also
investigate whether the correlation between union membership and perceived job insecurity
changes with the exposure (i.e. with tenure) to a union.2
To our knowledge, Bender & Sloane (1999) is the only paper whose focus has been on the
causal link between union status and job insecurity perceptions.3 Our paper diﬀers from that
of Bender & Sloane (1999) in two important ways. First, our dataset consists of 17 repeated
cross-sections that cover a 30-year period. This allows us to use time varying instruments
2If the diﬀerential is driven by the conﬂicting nature of collective bargaining or by the increased sensitivity
to job security issues, then we could expect the diﬀerential to increase with union exposure. On the other
hand, if a union represents the median voter, then we could expect the diﬀerence between unionized and
non-unionized workers to be driven by junior workers.
3The main focus of the existing job insecurity perception literature has been on determining whether
perceptions of job insecurity have changed over time (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998, Schmidt 1999, Green
et al. 2000, Linz & Semykina 2008, Brochu & Zhou 2009). There also exists a related (and extensive)
literature that looks at the link between union membership and job satisfaction (Borjas 1979, Bender &
Sloane 1998, Bryson et al. 2004).
2(e.g. changes in labor laws, and unionization rates at the state level).4 We are also able to
take full advantage of the richness of the attitudinal (i.e. opinion) information in the GSS. We
can, for example, proxy for an individual’s personal traits and perceived employer-employer
relations, and thus deal with aspects of worker/ﬁrm heterogeneity. The many cross sections
also allow us the see whether the union/non-union diﬀerential in perceived job insecurity
varies across the business cycle as some of the objective data would suggest (Pearce 1983).
Second, our paper is the ﬁrst to explore the causal link between union membership and
perceived job insecurity for the United States—a country that experienced a dramatic decline
in unionization rates over the last forty years (Farber 1990, Hirsch 2008). We can therefore
examine the extent to which perceived job insecurity is linked to the union environment. In
particular, we can see if the union/non-union perception diﬀerential changed with the decline
of unions in the United States.
We ﬁnd, as in previous North American studies (Aaronson & Sullivan 1998, Brochu &
Zhou 2009), that union members are more likely to be insecure about both their current and
future job prospects after controlling for confounding factors. Over the 1978-2008 period,
union members are about 3.5 percentage points more likely to feel insecure about their
current job. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant as the average level of insecurity was only 10.5
percent in the non-union sector. The diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant for the insecurity about
future jobs.
Our evidence—both with respect to our instrumental variables approach and proxy vari-
ables approach—suggest that self-selection is not driving our ﬁnding that union workers are
relatively more insecure about their current job. We ﬁnd that the positive correlation is lo-
calized in the primary and secondary sectors, and is counter-cyclical in nature. Interestingly,
import penetration does not explain the perception diﬀerential found in the manufacturing
sector. Finally, we do not ﬁnd any evidence to support the claim that job insecurity per-
ceptions changed with the decline of unions in the United States. There continued to be a
counter-cyclical relationship in the manufacturing sector well after the dramatic decline in
unionization of the 1970s and 1980s. We ﬁnd some (weak) evidence that union members’
perceived job insecurity increases (relative to non-union members) with union exposure, but
the results should be interpreted with caution as the coeﬃcient estimates for the interac-
tion terms between union and tenure, and tenure squared and union are not statistically
signiﬁcant.
The next section describes the GSS data used in this paper while Section 3 presents
4Bender & Sloane (1999) rely on one cross section, i.e. the 1986 British Social Change and Economic
Life Initiative, and on opinion-based variables as instruments which can be problematic when looking at a
subjective dependent variable (Bryson et al. 2004). The (subjective) instruments are likely not to satisfy the
exclusion restriction.
3the empirical strategies used to address the potential endogeneity issue related to union
membership. Sections 4 presents our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2D a t a
We use the American General Social Survey over the 1978-2008 period. There are two
advantages to using the GSS: 1) there are many years of job perception data which makes
it possible to use time-variant state-level characteristics as instruments; and 2) the GSS
asks respondents their views on a variety of topics, from very speciﬁc (e.g. perceptions of
employee-employer relations) to more general (e.g. political views). The presence of these
variables will allow us to address the endogeneity of union status in ways that are not possible
with other more traditional labor data sources like the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The GSS is a repeated cross section dataset; the same survey is repeated over time, but
with diﬀerent respondents in each survey year. Most importantly, the GSS consistently ask
respondents two job insecurity perception questions (Davis et al. 2009): 1) “Thinking about
the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid oﬀ: very
likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?” and 2), “About how easy would it be
for you to ﬁnd a job with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe
beneﬁts you now have? Would you say very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?” The
GSS also gathers a broad range of social and demographic information. Note, however, that
it identiﬁes union membership, and not the broader measure of union coverage. Fortunately,
the diﬀerence is very small in the U.S. (Card et al. 2003).
We restrict our sample to private-sector workers who are 18 to 64 years of age and are
not self-employed. The self-employed were excluded because the process that determines
job insecurity for both subjective and objective measures, is very diﬀerent for them. Public
sector employees were also removed because unions play a diﬀerent role in the public sector,
with union activity restrictions, for instances on wage determination and on the right to
strike, that are not present in the private sector (Ehrenberg & Smith 2006).5 We impose
an upper age restriction of 64 years of age so as to abstract from retirement issues. Finally,
individuals with missing information on gender, age, education, part-time status, union
status, and industry classiﬁcation are also excluded—these individuals represent only 1.77
percent of the original sample.
Our restricted sample consists of 7,519 individual observations over the 1978-2008 period.
5The union literature has tended to focus on the private sector. As a robustness check, we carried out
regressions that included public sector employees, and it does not aﬀect our ﬁndings. We present results
including public-sector workers in the Appendix. We also tried speciﬁcations where we excluded those under
the age of 25—because some may not have ﬁnished school. It does not materially aﬀect our ﬁndings.
4We have data for the following 17 years: 1978, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,
1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008. The yearly sample range in size
from 225 in 2002, to 703 in 1983.
We provide some summary statistics in Table 1.6 Most variables are self-explanatory, ex-
cept for the industry variables. We divided industries into four broad categories: the primary
sector includes agriculture, ﬁsheries, forestry, mining, and construction; the secondary sector
includes manufacturing of both durable and non-durable goods; and the tertiary sector which
is divided into two categories: ‘Transport & Communication’, and ‘Other Services’. ‘Trans-
port & Communication’ includes transportation, communication and other public utilities,
and wholesale trade and retail trade. ‘Other Services’ represents ﬁnance, insurance, business
and repair services, personal services, entertainment and recreation services, and professional
and related services. Note that the unionization rates across various groups are in line with
other studies: For example, the unionization rate is higher for men, and blacks. The positive
relationship between age and unionization rates is consistent with the decline of unions over
the 1978-2008 period.
3 Empirical Approach
The benchmark econometric model takes the form of a probit model
insecure
∗
it = β0 + β1unionit + Xitβ +  it (1)
where insecure∗
it is the latent perceived job insecurity for individual i in period t,a n d it is
the normally distributed error term. We observe the binary variable insecureit which equals
one if the latent variable is greater than zero (i.e. the job is perceived to be insecure), and
zero otherwise. unionit is a dummy variable that equals one if the worker is a union member
and zero otherwise. Finally, Xit is a vector of individual and job characteristics, and region
and time dummies.
We explore two measures of perceived insecurity: insecurity with respect to the current
job, and insecurity with respect to the future job. For the current job, the insecurity dummy
equals one if the respondent thinks that it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose
his/her job or be laid oﬀ over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). For the future
job, the insecurity dummy equals one if the respondent thinks that ﬁnding a job with the
6In Table 1 and all subsequent regressions, we rely on normalized GSS weights; where the weights sum
to the number of observations in each survey. We repeated our analysis using a diﬀerent weighting strategy
where the weights sum to 1 in each survey. We also repeated the analysis without using weights. Our results
are very similar irrespective of the weighting strategy. See the Appendix for more details.
5same income and fringe beneﬁts that he/she now has would not be easy at all (and zero
otherwise).
3.1 Econometric Issues
Two important econometric issues need to be addressed. The ﬁrst diﬃculty arises from the
fact that our dependent variable is subjective, while the second comes from the potential
selection into unionized jobs. We discuss these issues below. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001)
argue that subjective measures can be aﬀected by the wording and the order of the survey
questions, as well as by the potential ‘instability’ of attitudes. In theory, these problems
could be serious enough to render such measures unreliable for regression analysis. We do
not believe that these potential problems are of serious concern in our case. The wording of
our questions of interest has stayed the same since the GSS started asking them in 1978. The
choice of answers oﬀered to respondents has also been stable over time. The job insecurity
perception questions tend to be asked early in the survey, prior to other perception questions.
As such, one does not need to worry that the respondent will try to be consistent with answers
given to other perception questions. Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) also warn against the
use of subjective measures when the respondents could have unstable—changing drastically
over a short period of time—or no attitudes toward the question of interest. Our empirical
results suggest that the perceived job insecurity is stable to the extent that our results are
in line with those looking at actual job insecurity. For example, perceived job insecurity is
inversely related to education, and positively correlated with the unemployment rate. We
address these concerns in more details in the Appendix.
The second issue is related to self-selection. It is possible that the union eﬀect observed
in the data is spurious, i.e. it is due to endogeneity problems. Aaronson & Sullivan (1998)
state that “workers who are more insecure about their future employment are more likely
to join a union.” Workers may also choose to join/form a union based on their ability. In
addition, Union Determination models (e.g. the Supply and Demand model (Schnabel 2003),
and the Queuing model (Farber 1983), emphasize the endogenous aspect of union status. An
increase in perceived job insecurity at the ﬁrm level, (e.g. due to mismanagement, unfair labor
practices) could also make the non-union worker prefer a unionized environment.
Given the repeated cross sectional nature of our data, we cannot include an individual
ﬁxed eﬀect term in our regression model. We have to use a diﬀerent approach to cope with
the self-selection issue. The richness of the GSS allows for two empirical strategies to deal
with potential self-selection: a proxy approach and an instrumental variables (IV) approach.
The time-series aspect of the GSS allows for the use of instruments that rely on ﬂuctuations
6in state-level characteristics. In particular, we used both (together and separately) right-
to-works laws and state-level union prevalence as instruments. Another key strength of the
GSS data is the attitudinal (i.e. opinion) information. The availability of such information
allows us to complement our IV-approach with an alternative strategy for dealing with
potential diﬀerences between unionized and non-unionized workers. We used the attitudinal
information (e.g. importance of job security) to proxy for an individual’s personal traits, and
thus deal with some aspects of worker heterogeneity. Combining these two fundamentally
diﬀerent strategies will shed light on the likelihood that the positive correlation between
union membership and perceived job insecurity is due to worker self-selection.
4R e s u l t s
In this section, we start by presenting the results from estimating equation (1), and then
present the results from our IV and proxy approaches—two strategies attempting to deal
with potential endogeneity issues.
Tables 2 and 3 present the probit marginal eﬀects from estimating equation (1) with
current and future job insecurity measures as dependent variables, respectively.7 Controls
are added sequentially, from columns (1) to (4) to see whether the union coeﬃcient estimate
is robust to changes in speciﬁcation. Columns (1) to (4) all suggest that the union eﬀect
is economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Union members are between 3.1 and 3.9 per-
centage points more likely to feel insecure about their current job than their non-unionized
counterparts, which is signiﬁcant given that the average level of insecurity was only 10.5
percent in the non-union sector. Finally, while the estimates presented in columns (1) to (4)
are based on a broad industry classiﬁcation, column (5) presents results from an identical
speciﬁcation to column (4) with the exception that we used a much narrower industry clas-
siﬁcation (3-digit industry classiﬁcation).8 The narrower classiﬁcation does not aﬀect our
results.
7Using a probit model or a linear probability model gives very similar results. Table A.1 presents the
results found in Table 2 when a linear probability model is used, instead of a probit. For Table 2 and all
subsequent tables, we rely on weighted standard errors. We also tried clustering at the region-year level.
The standard errors are of similar magnitude.
8Note that the probit estimation drops observations from industries in which all, or none of the workers
fear for their job. This is why the sample size drops from 7,436 to 6,659. Again, note that the union
coeﬃcient estimate is very similar to the one obtained from a linear probability model that retains all 7,436
observations. The 3-digit industry classiﬁcation in the GSS is based on the 1970 and 1980 Census Industry
Classiﬁcations. As some classes have changed when moving from the 1970 to the 1980 classiﬁcation, we
interact industry with a dummy equal to 1 for observations for which we only have the 1980 classiﬁcation so
that the 1970 and 1980 classiﬁcations with the same identiﬁer (i.e. numerical code) are allowed to represent
diﬀerent industries.
7Although we do not show the coeﬃcients estimates for all control variables, their signs are
in line with expectations and with other studies that have looked at job security perception.
For example, while more educated individuals and older individuals fear less for their job,
part time workers and blacks tend to fear more.
In Table 3, we investigate whether union workers think that it would be hard for them
to ﬁnd a job with similar pay and beneﬁts if they were to be laid oﬀ. If unions conferred a
rent to their members, then we could imagine that they would be more likely to be insecure
about their future job than similar non-unionized workers. Table 3 conﬁrms this hypothesis:
unionized workers are generally more than 15 percentage points more likely to fear for their
future job. This diﬀerence is large considering that 35.4 percent of non-union workers are
insecure about their future job prospects.
Since the more surprising ﬁnding is that unionized workers are more likely to fear for
their present job, we now investigate whether this ﬁnding could be due to self-selection.
4.1 Instrumental-Variables Approach
We estimated equation (1) using a set of instruments to tackle the potential endogeneity
problem coming from the union variable. Table 4 presents the IV-estimation results (based
on the speciﬁcation of column (4) in Table 2) using two instruments. The state unionization
rate should not directly aﬀect an individual’s job insecurity once we control for her/his
job industry and labor market conditions (controlled for using year eﬀects), but should be
correlated with the probability that an employee is unionized.9 The estimated eﬀect of
union membership on insecurity is still positive when we use state unionization rate as an
instrument. However, as in many cases where the instrument does not vary at the individual
level, the estimate is imprecise. The estimate of the union parameter is 0.202 with standard
errors equal to 0.126—the p-value being 0.111. Not surprisingly, the instrument passes the
ﬁrst-stage (rule-of-thumb) test as the F-statistic is clearly above 10 (Staiger & Stock 1997).
The estimated union eﬀect is, in our opinion, too large to be credible. However, one should
take into account that the standard errors are relatively large. If the main endogeneity
problem comes from self-selection (from ‘worriers’) into unionized jobs, we believe that our
instrument is valid as it should not be correlated with the error term once we control for the
state of the labor market (which is done here using time ﬁxed-eﬀects). We obtain similar
results when we control for the region- or state-level unemployment rates.
9The state unionization rates are from Hirsch et al. (2001). We tested for whether the union variable
is endogenous in the linear probability model using a Hausman endogeneity test, and in the probit model
using a Rivers-Vuong endogeneity test. In both cases, we assumed that state unionization rate is a valid
instrument. For both tests, the null hypothesis that union membership is not endogenous is only rejected at
the 10 percent conﬁdence level; the p-values are 0.098 and 0.101, respectively.
8We have also used right-to-work (RTW) laws—alone and combined with the unionization
rate—as instruments since they are expected to decrease the likelihood of union membership.
Again, the estimated eﬀect of union membership on insecurity stays positive. In the case
where RTW is used alone, although the estimate is large (0.412), it is only statistically
signiﬁcant at a 10 percent conﬁdence level (s.e. = 0.243). When combining the unionization
rate and the RTW laws as instruments, the estimated eﬀect is 0.221 with standard errors
equal to 0.125. Overall, the instrumental-variables estimation does not suggest that self-
selection is a main factor behind our ﬁndings in Table 2.
4.2 Proxy Approach
As previously discussed, we do not believe that opinions of respondents make good instru-
ments, but they can, however, be used as proxy variables. As is the case with ability in a
Mincerian wage equation, we recognize that there are no perfect proxies; there will probably
remain some unobserved heterogeneity that may be correlated with union status. If the
evidence, when using a series of proxies, points systematically in the same direction (and it
does) then the proxy approach, albeit imperfect, still provides useful evidence in determining
whether (or not) the union eﬀect is an artifact of self selection. Note that, although the GSS
asks a variety of opinion questions, many of them are only asked in select years. As such,
our proxy approach will consist of estimating the eﬀect of each proxy separately.
The 1985, 1991 and 1993 surveys ask respondents to rank what matters most in a job.
The choices include ‘no danger of being ﬁred’, ‘high income’, ‘chance of advancement’, ‘short
working hours’, and ‘work gives a sense of accomplishment’. By including a variable that
accounts for whether an individual values job security, one can directly tackle the issue raised
by Aaronson & Sullivan (1998) who believe that insecure workers self-select into union jobs.
Table 5 presents the eﬀect of controlling for the importance of job security on the union
coeﬃcient estimate. We tried two diﬀerent ways of controlling for the importance of job
security.10 The sign of the importance of job security is positive, but it does not aﬀect the
union ﬁnding.
We tried a variety of other controls to account for whether the respondent was a ‘worrier’,
including whether the respondent tended to worry about little things, whether he/she felt
safe at home, and whether he/she would be afraid to walk alone at night. Again, the inclusion
of these variables did not aﬀect our ﬁndings. Although not an opinion variable, we also tried
to account for whether the respondent had been unemployed in the recent past. This could
aﬀect the workers perception of job security (the individual could become more fearful) which
10‘Importance of Job Security 1’ equals one if job security is ranked most important, and zero otherwise.
‘Importance of Job Security 2’ equals one if it is most or next most important, and zero otherwise.
9in turn could aﬀect his/her decision to join the union sector. The variable that accounted
for past unemployment spells was statistically signiﬁcant in our regression, but the union
coeﬃcient did not change.
Finally, ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics could aﬀect job insecurity levels, which could also
inﬂuence workers’ decisions to form (or join) a union. The quality of a ﬁrm’s management
team is a prime example. Recent GSS surveys ask respondents about the quality of employer-
employee relations in their workplace, allowing us to see whether poor employer-employee
relations could explain the observed correlation between union membership and perceived
job insecurity. As shown in Table 5, we control for poor relations by including a binary
variable that equals one if the respondent says that the relations are quite bad or very bad,
and zero otherwise. The relations variable was economically and statistically signiﬁcant, but
as was the case with our other proxy variables, its inclusion did not aﬀect our ﬁndings with
respect to the impact of union membership on insecurity perceptions.
Table 5 does reveal, however, that the union eﬀect is sensitive to the choice of sample
years. More precisely, the eﬀect appears to be counter-cyclical; when we focus more on
expansionary periods, as is the case when controlling for employer-employee relations (i.e.
columns (4) and (5)), the union eﬀect is muted.11 We further investigate the cyclicality of
the ‘union membership eﬀect’ in the next sub-section.
4.3 Potential Sources of the Diﬀerential
Empirical evidence suggests that the presence of unions can result in more layoﬀs. Medoﬀ
(1979) and Blau & Kahn (1983), for example, found a signiﬁcant union eﬀect in the manu-
facturing sector.12 Pearce (1983) examined the link between unionism and cyclical behavior,
and found the sensitivities of employment to excess demand were relatively greater for union
members. Table 6 examines whether these sectorial and cyclical diﬀerences are also present
in the subjective data.
The ﬁrst set of results in Table 6 (columns (1) through (3)) is for the full sample, the
second (columns (4) through (6)) and third (columns (7) through (9)) sets are for the non-
recessionary and recessionary years, respectively. Within each set, we investigate whether the
11For the columns (1) through (3) sub-sample—where one sees a strong union eﬀect—the unemployment
rate was 7.0 percent, while it was only 5.4 percent for the sub-sample used in columns (4) and (5).
12Montgomery (1991), on the other hand, found that the union eﬀect was larger in the non-manufacturing
sector. He also found that controlling for establishment size (in a non-linear way) muted the manufacturing
sector union eﬀect. Establishment size is available in the GSS, but only for 1991 onward (except for 1993
when it was not asked). We tried speciﬁcations where we controlled for establishment size by including
binary variables for six of the seven response intervals, for samples that included all industries, and also
for manufacturing and non-manufacturing separately. In all cases, controlling for establishment size did not
aﬀect our union ﬁnding.
10union eﬀect is homogeneous across industries by including interaction terms. For these spec-
iﬁcations, the union coeﬃcient estimate (e.g. 0.070 under column (3)) represents the union
eﬀect for the secondary sector industry. The interaction terms (e.g. Primary Sector*Union)
capture diﬀerences in the union eﬀect as compared to the eﬀect in the secondary sector.
Focussing on the full sample, one can see that the positive correlation between union
membership and perceived job insecurity comes from the primary and the secondary sec-
tors. Union members in the manufacturing sector are between 7.0 to 7.1 percentage points
more likely to feel insecure about their present job than non-union members—a diﬀerence
that is economically very signiﬁcant. For the tertiary sector (transportation and communi-
cations, and other services) there is essentially no diﬀerence between union and non-union
workers. These sectoral diﬀerences remain essentially unchanged when one splits the sample
into recession and non-recessionary years. What does change, however, is that the (union)
insecurity diﬀerential in the manufacturing sector rises dramatically in recessionary periods.
We also tried controlling for cyclicality by using the full sample, but adding the monthly
regional (or state level) unemployment rate (UR) as a control (instead of year ﬁxed eﬀects).
The UR coeﬃcient was both economically and statistically insigniﬁcant, and did not aﬀect
the union ﬁndings. The UR coeﬃcient estimate became signiﬁcant, however, when the
year dummies were excluded. As such, job insecurity perceptions are correlated with the
unemployment rate, but the link disappears once year dummies are included in the regression
model, possibly because of insuﬃcient variation in the unemployment rate within regions.
Adding an unemployment rate-union interaction term, however, does make a diﬀerence. The
interaction term is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. As was the case when we split our
sample into recessionary and non-recessionary years, we ﬁnd that the manufacturing sector
drives the union eﬀect.
Import penetration can have an impact on plant survival and employment growth (Bernard
et al. 2006, Khandelwal 2010), so we explored whether it could explain why we ﬁnd a
union/non-union diﬀerence in job insecurity in the manufacturing sector. Table 7 presents
the results when an import penetration variable and its interaction with union status are
included as additional regressors.13 Given that the trade data were only available up to
2005, and there are no GSS survey in this year, we restricted our analysis to the 1978-2004
13Import penetration is deﬁned as in Bertrand (2004). Import data is available at the Standard Industry
Classiﬁcation levels. The GSS, however, used the Census classiﬁcation. The early GSS surveys relied on
the 3-digit 1970 Census Industry Classiﬁcation (CIC70), and starting in 1988, the GSS moved to the 3-digit
1980 Census Industrial Classiﬁcation (CIC80). To construct our combined dataset, we relied on Schott’s
Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC87) trade data (1976-2005) and the following two crosswalks: a SIC87
to CIC80 crosswalk to make the trade data compatible with the GSS data; and a CIC70 to CIC80 crosswalk
to create a uniform industry classiﬁcation (i.e. CIC80) across GSS surveys. More details on both the trade
data and the crosswalks can be found in the Appendix.
11period. The import penetration coeﬃcient estimate is statistically insigniﬁcant. The same
applies for the interaction term. We also tried a speciﬁcation where we included the change
in import penetration from period t − k and period t for k =1 ,2,3,4 (and its interaction
with union status), and found very similar results as in Table 7. These ﬁndings would seem
to indicate that competitive pressure (as measured by import penetration) cannot explain
why union workers feel more insecure about their jobs. As a ﬁnal robustness check, we al-
lowed low-wage and high-wage countries (as deﬁned in Kandilov (2010)) to have their own
‘import-penetration eﬀect’—again, the union eﬀect is unchanged.
As previously mentioned, unions may ‘manufacture’ perception of job insecurity. Union
leaders may want their members to feel more insecure and therefore more dependent upon
the union for security. It is not unreasonable to expect this perception eﬀect to increase
with union exposure. This would suggest that the union/non-union diﬀerential in perceived
job insecurity (all else being equal) should increase with tenure. On the other hand, if
unions represent the preferences of the median ‘voter’, the diﬀerence in perceived job security
between unionized and non-unionized workers could be concentrated among more juniors
workers (Blau & Kahn 1983). Therefore, examining how perceived insecurity changes along
the tenure dimension can shed some light on the potential driven forces behind the union/non-
union perception diﬀerential.
Unfortunately, the GSS has information about tenure only for a few select years (1991,
2002, and 2006). We did investigate whether the ‘union eﬀect’ changes with (a quadratic
function of) tenure, but the results should be interpreted with caution as the sample size
becomes small (1,036 observations of which only 161 are unionized). Not surprisingly, the co-
eﬃcient estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant. However, we do ﬁnd (as in Bender & Sloane
(1999)) that for low and very high levels of tenure (i.e. below 3 and above 24 years of service),
perceived job insecurity is more prevalent among non-unionized workers. Interestingly, our
results suggest that for the ﬁrst 13 years of service—more than 75 percent of our workers
have less than 13 years of service—, union workers become relatively more insecure with each
additional year of tenure.14 This would tend to support the idea that job insecurity increases
with union exposure, but again the coeﬃcient estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to investigate why we observe a positive correlation between union mem-
bership and job insecurity. In particular, we try to see whether this correlation is simply
due to self-selection into unionized jobs. Using the American General Social Survey over
14We ﬁnd a similar pattern when looking at the raw data.
12the 1978-2008 period, we ﬁnd that union members are about 3.5 percentage points more
likely to feel insecure about their current job relative to their non-unionized counterparts.
Our evidence—using both IV and proxy approaches—suggests that this eﬀect is not due to
self-selection.
The positive correlation appears to localized in the primary and secondary (manufac-
turing) sectors. Interestingly, this latter ﬁnding is not driven by import penetration, but
is counter-cyclical in nature; the union/non-union perception diﬀerential increases as the
economy worsens.
Finally, there is no evidence of a structural change in job security perception diﬀerential
accompanying the well-documented decline in unionization rates in the United States. There
continued to be a counter-cyclical relationship in the manufacturing sector well after the
dramatic decline in unionization of the 1970s and 1980s—as evident by the positive and
economically signiﬁcant union/non-union perception diﬀerential of the recessionary periods
of the early 1990s and late 2000s.
This paper suggests two promising avenues of future research. The ﬁrst would be to
further focus on the perception itself. As previously mentioned, we ﬁnd some weak evidence
that the perceived job insecurity diﬀerential increases with tenure. However, data limitations
do not allow us to fully address the causal link between heightened insecurity perception and
the length of union exposure. This would require a source of data that is richer along the
tenure dimension.
A second avenue would to explore the link between unionization and actual job insecurity
using administrative data. In our study, we cannot make a distinction between fears of
temporary versus permanent layoﬀs. Unions may be more willing to accept layoﬀs as opposed
to, say, a reduction in hours—as long as they are temporary in nature. Hence, it is possible
that our results are, in part, due to the type of job layoﬀ that is more likely to aﬀect unionized
versus non-unionized workers. The use of administrative data sets would allow the researcher
to investigate whether unionized ﬁrms have, over the past thirty years, disproportionately
used temporary layoﬀs relative to non-unionized ﬁrms.
A Appendix
Public Sector
As discussed in Section 2, we excluded the public sector because unions may play a diﬀerent
role (e.g. on wage negotiation and the right to strike). In this subsection, we examine whether
the inclusion of the public sector changes any of our main ﬁndings. Table A.2 presents
13the probit marginal eﬀects from estimating equation (1)—using present job insecurity as
dependent variable—on our sample of respondents including public-sector workers. As with
Table 2, we add controls sequentially.
One can draw two conclusions when expanding the sample to include public-sector work-
ers: 1) The key ﬁndings about union membership are still present. The union coeﬃcient
remains positive (although slightly dampened), and both economically and statistically sig-
niﬁcant. When we allow for the union eﬀect to vary by sector (columns (5) and (6)), we
still ﬁnd that the primary and secondary sectors drive our results; and 2), the union eﬀect is
negative in the public sector. If it were the case that insecure workers self-select into union
jobs, one should also have seen a negative, and not positive, correlation between unionization
and job insecurity perception. As such, we believe this to be one further piece of evidence
to support our claim that self-selection is not the driving force behind our results.
Weights
In this subsection we explore alternative weighting strategies. We compare three approaches:
1) weighting the data so that the weights in survey year t add up to number of observations
in year t (‘Weight 1’). This weighting approach ensures that larger surveys play a larger role
in the estimation; 2) re-weighting the data so that the weights sum to one in each survey
year (‘Weight 2’); this means that each survey, irrespective of its sample size, plays an equal
role in the estimation; and 3) using equally weighted observations (‘Unweighted’).
Table A.3 compares the estimates presented in Table 2, obtained using our weight-
ing strategy (‘Weight 1’), to two alternative weighting strategies (i.e ‘Weight 2’ and ‘Un-
weighted’). Table A.3 shows that the choice of weighting strategy does not materially aﬀect
our ﬁndings.
Subjective Measure and Measurement Error
As we are using a subjective measure as dependent variable, we need to address some po-
tential concerns raised by some economists (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2001) on estimating
regressions using such measure. We address a series of potential threats below.
Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) mention that the wording and the ordering of the ques-
tions could aﬀect how survey respondents answer them, which could make our job insecurity
measure unreliable. This potential problem should not be of great concern in our case. The
wording for the current-job question has stayed the same over the years, and the question
clearly measures the outcome of interest, i.e. the perceived likelihood of job loss (or lay oﬀ)
over the next twelve months. A similar argument holds true for the future job question.
14For this question, the type of new job is also precisely deﬁned—a job with approximately
the same income and fringe beneﬁts as you now have. We believe that the job insecurity
questions are less open to interpretation as compared to other perception measures such
as happiness or job satisfaction. The respondents are oﬀered four choices of answers: very
likely, fairly likely, not too likely, and not likely at all. The recording of answers may be less
precise than in the Survey of Economic Expectations (SEE) where probabilistic choices are
given (Manski & Straub 2000), but it is more precise than the yes or no answers found in
the Canadian Gallup (Brochu & Zhou 2009). Most importantly, the choice of answers has
remained unchanged since 1977. Finally, the ordering of the questions should not create any
problem here since both job insecurity questions are always asked early in the survey and
typically follow standard employment questions. Hence, the GSS seems, in our opinion, to
minimize the any potential ‘cognitive problems’ linked to the use of subjective measures.
A second set of problems mentioned in Bertrand & Mullainathan (2001) is related to the
potential instability of the attitude (or the absence of an attitude) toward the question of
interest. The questions we are interested in are not related to ‘obscure’ subjects; we expect
workers to be familiar with the concept of job insecurity, and to have some opinion about
their own job insecurity. In fact, many of the GSS respondents have ‘strong’ opinions about
their perceived job insecurity: 66.3 percent of the respondents in our sample either answered
‘very likely’ or ‘not at all likely’, suggesting that the individuals in our sample do have an
attitude toward job insecurity. Now, if perceptions were unstable it would have aﬀected the
estimated eﬀect of other explanatory variables in the job insecurity perception regressions.
However, other estimated coeﬃcients (other than for union status) have the ‘right’ signs, i.e.
they are intuitive and in-line with objective data. Perceptions of job insecurity, for example,
are found to be inversely related with educational attainment (Brochu & Zhou 2009, Schmidt
1999). Other intuitive and consistent ﬁndings include: part-time workers feeling relatively
less secure about their job; white-collar workers feeling relatively more secure than blue
collar workers; the tertiary sector workers feeling more secure than primary and secondary
sector workers. That insecurities tend to mirror the business cycle, i.e. decrease in periods of
expansion only to bounce back in periods of recession, would also go against the argument
that perceptions are unstable over time. Furthermore, a recent paper by Bryson et al. (2009)
found that perceived job insecurity reacts negatively to an increase in actual job security,
presenting more evidence that our subjective measure is stable. Finally, the correlation
between perceptions of insecurity and subsequent job loss should be low if perceptions were
in fact unstable. Yet, researchers (Campbell et al. 2007, Stephens 2004) have found a strong
correlation between perceptions of job insecurity and future unemployment spells.
15International Trade Data and Crosswalks
We constructed our import penetration variable using Schott’s (2010) trade data. These
data are available on Schott’s International Economics Resource Page which can be accessed
through the NBER website. Schott extends Feenstra’s trade data up to 2005. The dataset
contains information on U.S. manufacturing exports, imports and shipments at the year,
country and 4-digit SIC87 level. A more detailed description of the data can be found in
Schott (2010).
Crosswalks
• CIC70 to CIC80 crosswalk; based on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1989), we created
a CIC70 to CIC80 crosswalk. The changes in industry classiﬁcation across time were
modest in nature, particularly in the manufacturing sector. As such, it was possible to
ﬁnd a compatible CIC80 match for all but seven CIC70 codes.
• SIC87 to CIC80 crosswalk; the 3-digit Census Industry classiﬁcation is based on the
4-digit Standard Industry classiﬁcation (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1989). We used an
exact SIC87 to CIC80 correspondence that is available on the BLS website. The corre-
spondence can be accessed through the following BLS link address: http://ferret.bls.
census.gov/items/value/valu 59185.htm. Given that the Current Population Survey
(CPS) also relied on the CIC80 for the 1983-1991 period, the same exact correspon-
dence (with detailed accompanying notes) can also be found in the CPS codebooks
(1983-1991) made available on the BLS website.
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Male 0.503 (0.500) 0.199
Female 0.497 (0.500) 0.134
B. Race
Non-Black 0.885 (0.319) 0.158
Black 0.115 (0.319) 0.232
C. Age
Age 18 to 24 0.137 (0.343) 0.083
Age 25 to 34 0.292 (0.455) 0.138
Age 35 to 44 0.265 (0.442) 0.188
Age 45 to 54 0.203 (0.402) 0.212
Age 55 to 64 0.103 (0.304) 0.212
D. Educational Attainment
Less than Hign School 0.127 (0.333) 0.184
Hign School 0.555 (0.497) 0.166
Associate/Junior College 0.073 (0.259) 0.142
Bachelor’s and up 0.245 (0.430) 0.165
E. Job Characteristics
Full-time 0.873 (0.333) 0.175
Part-time 0.127 (0.333) 0.106
F. Industry
Primary Sector 0.076 (0.265) 0.203
Secondary Sector 0.210 (0.408) 0.214
Trans. & Comm. 0.281 (0.450) 0.158
Other Services 0.433 (0.495) 0.142
Observations 7,519
Notes. The summary statistics are weighted. The weights are normalized to sum
up to the number of observations in each survey.
21Table 2: Union Membership and Perceived (Current) Job Insecurity: Probit
Models (Marginal Eﬀects Reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.039***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Primary Sector - - - 0.002 -
- - - (0.014) -
Trans. & Comm. - - - -0.044*** -
- - - (0.009) -
Other Services - - - -0.052*** -
- - - (0.010) -
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control No No Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects No No No No Yes
Observations 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436 6,659
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or
fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job or be laid oﬀ over the next twelve months
(and zero otherwise). Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
22Table 3: Union Membership and Perceived (Future) Job Insecurity: Probit
Models (Marginal Eﬀects Reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Union 0.203*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.173*** 0.129***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
Primary Sector - - - -0.165*** -
- - - (0.023) -
Trans. & Comm. - - - -0.124*** -
- - - (0.017) -
Other Services - - - -0.168*** -
- - - (0.017) -
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects No No No No Yes
Observations 7,430 7,430 7,430 7,430 7,288
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks that ﬁnding a job
with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe beneﬁts he/she
now has would not be easy at all (and zero otherwise). Weighted standard errors are
in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4: Instrumental-Variables Estimation Union Mem-
bership and Perceived (Current) Job Insecurity
(1) (2) (3)
A. First-Stage
State Unionization Rate 0.010*** - 0.010***
(0.002) - (0.002)
Right-to-Work Laws - -0.061*** -0.020
- (0.015) (0.016)
F-Statistic 45.43 16.12 23.45
{p-value}{ 0.0000}{ 0.0001}{ 0.0000}
B. Second-Stage
Union 0.202 0.412* 0.221*
(0.126) (0.243) (0.125)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects No No No
Observations 7,436 7,436 7,436
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks
it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose his/her job
or be laid oﬀ over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise).
The estimated models are based on the speciﬁcation of column
(4) in Table 2. The reported F-statistics are from a joint test
of signiﬁcance on the excluded instruments. Weighted standard
errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Table 7: Union Membership and Perceived (Current)
Job Insecurity in the Manufacturing Sector: Probit
Models (Marginal Eﬀects Reported)
(1) (2) (3)
Union 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.095***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.041)
Import - 0.031 0.060
- (0.073) (0.080)
Union*Import - - -0.161
- - (0.204)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent
thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will lose
his/her job or be laid oﬀ over the next twelve months (and
zero otherwise). The interaction term coeﬃcient estimates were
obtained using the methodology proposed in Ai and Norton
(2003). Weighted standard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁ-
cant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table A.1: Union Membership and Perceived (Current) Job Insecurity: Linear Probability Models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Union 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.040***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.027) (0.012)
Primary Sector - - - 0.003 0.004 0.005 -
- - - (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) -
Trans. & Comm. - - - -0.056*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -
- - - (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) -
Other Services - - - -0.060*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -
- - - (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) -
Primary Sector*Union - - - - - -0.004 -
- - - - - (0.052) -
Trans. & Comm.*Union - - - - -0.085*** -0.086*** -
- - - - (0.031) (0.034) -
Other Services*Union - - - - -0.088*** -0.089*** -
- - - - (0.027) (0.031) -
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she will
lose his/her job or be laid oﬀ over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). Weighted standard errors are
in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
26Table A.2: Union Membership and Perceived (Current) Job Insecurity When Including the
Public Sector: Probit Models (Marginal Eﬀects Reported)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Union 0.031*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.024** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.029**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012)
Primary Sector - - - 0.002 0.003 0.002 -
- - - (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) -
Trans. & Comm. - - - -0.043*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -
- - - (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) -
Other Services - - - -0.051*** -0.040** -0.040*** -
- - - (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) -
Public Sector - - - -0.049*** -0.032** -0.032** -
- - - (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) -
Primary Sector*Union - - - - - 0.004 -
- - - - - (0.043) -
Trans. & Comm.*Union - - - - -0.070** -0.069** -
- - - - (0.027) (0.030) -
Other Services*Union - - - - -0.079*** -0.078*** -
- - - - (0.028) (0.030) -
Public Sector*Union - - - - -0.093*** -0.092*** -
- - - - (0.032) (0.034) -
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 8,068 8,068 8,068 8,068 8,068 8,068 7,287
Notes. The dependent variable equals 1 if the respondent thinks it is very likely or fairly likely that he/she
will lose his/her job or be laid oﬀ over the next twelve months (and zero otherwise). The interaction term
coeﬃcient estimates were obtained using the methodology proposed in Ai and Norton (2003). Weighted stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
27Table A.3: Union Membership and Perceived (Current) Job Insecurity When Using Alternative
Weighting Strategies: Probit Models (Marginal Eﬀects Reported)
Speciﬁcation (4) Speciﬁcation (6)
Weight 1 Weight 2 Unweighted Weight 1 Weight 2 Unweighted
Union 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.070*** 0.086*** 0.061***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022) (0.026) (0.021)
Primary Sector 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.002 0.011 0.005
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017)
Trans. & Comm. -0.044*** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.034*** -0.023* -0.033***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Other Services -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.040***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Primary Sector*Union - - - -0.005 -0.026 0.019
- - - (0.044) (0.049) (0.042)
Trans. & Comm.*Union - - - -0.071*** -0.089*** -0.069***
- - - (0.031) (0.035) (0.028)
Other Services*Union - - - -0.079*** -0.096*** -0.064***
- - - (0.031) (0.035) (0.028)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender and Race Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age and Education Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Part-time Status Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No No
Observations 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436 7,436
Notes. Table A.3 compares the estimates presented in Table 2, obtained using our weighting strategy (Weight
1), to two alternative weighting strategies (i.e ‘Weight’ 2 and ‘Unweighted’). Estimates under ‘Weight 1’ are
obtained using weights that sum to the sample size of each (yearly) survey. Estimates under ‘Weight 2’ are
obtained using weights that sum to 1 for each year of the survey. The interaction term coeﬃcient estimates
were obtained using the methodology proposed in Ai and Norton (2003). Weighted standard errors are in
parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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